Review of \u3cem\u3eTragedies of Our Own Making: How Private Choices Have Created Public Bankruptcy.\u3c/em\u3e Richard Neely. Reviewed by W. Joseph Heffernan, University of Texas, Austin. by Heffernan, W. Joseph
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare 
Volume 23 
Issue 1 March Article 17 
March 1996 
Review of Tragedies of Our Own Making: How Private Choices 
Have Created Public Bankruptcy. Richard Neely. Reviewed by W. 
Joseph Heffernan, University of Texas, Austin. 
W. Joseph Heffernan 
University of Texas, Austin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw 
 Part of the Social Work Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Heffernan, W. Joseph (1996) "Review of Tragedies of Our Own Making: How Private Choices Have 
Created Public Bankruptcy. Richard Neely. Reviewed by W. Joseph Heffernan, University of Texas, Austin.," 
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 23 : Iss. 1 , Article 17. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol23/iss1/17 
This Book Review is brought to you by the Western 
Michigan University School of Social Work. For more 
information, please contact wmu-
scholarworks@wmich.edu. 
198 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
in works inspired by the street-level approach, Rothstein in his
seminal work on employment services has manage to capture
their lay character through the concept of "cadre" organizations,
while Roine Johansson focussed on the client-relation in a study
of agencies very similar to Hvinden's research objects.
Whatever criticisms and questions that this book might pro-
voke, there is no doubt that it is an innovative and at times brilliant
study of the administration of social welfare.
Sven E. Olsson Hort
Stockholm University
Sweden
Richard Neely, Tragedies of Our Own Making: How Private Choices
Have Created Public Bankruptcy. Urbana, IL. University of Illi-
nois Press, 1994. $19.95 hardcover.
By Richard Neely's statement the purpose of his book is to
pull together the various strands of our perception of public bank-
ruptcy in US social programs; (1) the belief in the declining
efficacy of social welfare programs despite the infusion of more
dollars, (2) the collapse of public education, (3) the failure of
industry and governments to deal with declining productivity
of the American labor force, and (4) rising crime along with ris-
ing expenditure on crime control. We are also promised to be
provided with a blueprint to cheap and efficient ways to reverse
the deterioration in public programs and the loss of faith in gov-
ernment. This is an ambitious task.
Neely, from his experience as judge and later Justice of the
West Virginia Supreme Court structures his argument around the
obvious truth that bad private choices lead to unintended public
problems. He is most specific with regard to decisions about the
creation and dissolution of the family unit. He argues that citizens
need to be better informed about the real costs and the real benefits
of the private choices that they make. He argues that it is in the
interest of society to subsidize good choices and penalize poor
ones through programs of social intervention.
The concept of social intervention implies a "rebuttable pre-
sumtion" that the most desirable mode of choice is a network
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of private arrangements; a justification of social intervention is
based on the definition of conditions where the central presum-
tion is rebuttable. In a democratic society we define that condition
through a political process.
Neely begins correctly, in my view, by establishing the point
that social problems have social causes that is choices by individ-
uals in social situations. Individual choices are often irreversible
but new social interventions can make "bad choices" less likely.
These social interventions while providing a net social benefit also
have real social costs. Neely proceeds to show that the distribution
of social costs of corrective action and the distributions of social
benefits of that corrective actions are often at political odds with
one another. Those who benefit are not expected to, or are unable
to, bear the costs; those who are expected to bear the costs do
not directly receive the benefit. This mal-distribution of costs and
benefits of social programs leads to under investment in social
programs from a societal prospective. Neely cites such diverse
economists as Nobel Laurelist James Buchanan and Kenneth Ar-
row to support his view. More to the point the first two chapters of
his book are a lucid and readable restatement of their arguments.
Neely makes a further point; there is a tendency to mal-invest
in social programs because providers, (social workers, teachers,
health care providers etc.) establish the political support for pro-
grams rather than those who are targeted to benefit. The providers
benefit from the program being in place without regard to the net
social benefit of the programs or even the benefit to the recipient.
Efficiency in social programs is at bottom a problem in who
is measuring the costs and benefits of social interventions and
their capacity to translate that perception into public programs.
Simply because you or I or Judge Neely does not see or feel a
social cost does not mean a social cost is not there. In the final
chapter Judge Neely tells us for example that "free norplant" is
the ideal solution for our illegitimacy problem. He doesn't entirely
forget his argument that someone has to pay for the norplant. He
suggests that if we would be but willing to give norplant to rich
teenagers as well as poor teenagers, the mal-distribution of costs
and benefits would be solved. He asserts, as an aside, that this
would be politically difficult but says that the political difficulty
does not reduce the argument that it would be an efficient way
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to reduce illegitimacy. It is politically difficult not because of any
defect in who pays for the implantation. It is politically difficult
because we are divided on the valued definition of the problem.
Many Americans believe that it is the notion that teenage sex
can be had without adverse consequence, not illegitimacy, which
is the real problem; while many other Americans believe that
sexual "misbehavior" is inevitable and we should seek to control
its consequences i.e. norplant.
Neely seems to forget that by the simple device of ignoring
the costs beliefs of those whose perceptions differ from our own,
all social problems become capable of easy and efficient solution.
Judge Neely says that the centerpiece of his whole book is a need
for a massive publicly sponsored advertising campaign to explain
to the public what is happening to us. (p. 150, Neely) He admits
that "when we are talking about divisive political matters (like
whether to raise taxes or invade Cuba ) propagandizing with paid
media is entirely inappropriate." (ibid.) He then likens the ads for
norplant to the ads for the polio vaccines. The difference he tells
us is that there is no political lobby against vaccines the way their
is against contraceptives. In fact there were several groups against
the vaccine but they lost the political battles. Who is going to write
the ads about the social benefits and costs of norplant; The Cath-
olic Council of Bishops or the National Organization of Women?
The question is whose values about "sexual misbehavior" and
whose values about the "illegitimacy" should guide us about
public policy towards norplant and a public subsidy for its use.
We already have a massive advertising campaigns to explain to the
public what is happening to us; they are called media campaigns of
interest groups. The political lobby against contraceptives, which
Neely deplores, is simply someone else's effort to explain to the
public what is happening to us.
W. Joseph Heffernan
University of Texas
Austin
